

Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) arrived in Athens from Macedonia in 367. Aristotle studied at Plato's Academy for twenty years, until Plato's death in 347. When Plato died, Aristotle returned to Macedonia to become the tutor of Alexander. In 344, Aristotle returned to Athens to found the Lyceum. Aristotle remained in Athens the rest of his life. Aristotle's spouse, Pythias, died in 335. Aristotle lived the rest of his life with his slave, Herpyllis. Aristotle's son by Herpyllis was named Nichomachus. Aristotle died in 322 of a digestive disorder.

BOOK I. *Chapter 1.* All human action aims to acquire some good. These goods are the object of the activities undertaken. *Chapter 2.* Some goods have stages in reaching them. The chief good is the final aim. Knowledge of the good is the highest form of knowledge; this is plainly politics. Building goodness in a city exceeds building goodness for oneself, for the good of a city includes within it the good for its citizens (1094b). *Chapter 3.* Educated people ask for no more precision from a topic than the topic will bear. Young and immature persons should not study politics, for they follow their feelings, not their reason (1095a). *Chapter 4.* The highest good is living well and acting well, which constitutes happiness. People disagree about the exact shape of living and acting well. Only those of good habits can comprehend politics. *Chapter 5.* People seek their happiness by pleasure (the masses), by political honor (sophisticated men of action), or by a life of contemplation. Wealth is a means to other ends, and so cannot be the highest good. As to political life, neither honor or virtue quite describe the good. *Chapter 6.* Aristotle apologizes for differing with his friends, the Platonists. Forms make little sense, since we speak of many goods, many rights, many substances. Eternal things are no better than transient ones. A Form without any instances is useless. Knowing things-in-themselves, apart from specific examples in life, helps no one toward excellence. *Chapter 7.* What do various forms of goodness have in common? The chief good is that which we pursue for itself and not as a means to an end. Only happiness do we pursue without further purpose (1097b). Happiness is a self-sufficient reason for doing anything, at least for people living with others they care about. For all people are essentially social (1097b). The characteristic activity of a human is living in accord with reason, which amounts to habits of virtue over the course of a person's entire life (1098a). Explanations of first principles differ according to what is being explained. An explanation matters, but is not all that matters. *Chapter 8.* Many other philosophers' views accord with what Aristotle has presented. The good person does good acts. To do good acts, a person needs some financial resources (1099b). *Chapter 9.* What is the source of virtue? Does virtue emerge from learning, habituation, training, chance, gods? Aristotle equivocates, but reiterates that political science is the chief good, and it aims to produce people who are good and do well by others throughout their lives. *Chapter 10.* Since happiness requires a whole lifetime of action, can any living person be called happy? This is a difficult question to answer. What matters is virtuous action. When chance events trouble a virtuous person, he meets those calamities with a great soul. *Chapter 11.* The untoward events of a friend's life may affect one. We know little about the effects of events on the dead, though it is unlikely anything affects them so potently as to make them virtuous when they died without virtue. *Chapter 12.* Should one praise or honor virtue? Praise relates to things approved in relation to others. Honor elevates a thing itself alone. Virtue should be honored. *Chapter 13.* Politicians care for human souls, making them virtuous by laws. The soul achieves virtue. Souls have rational and subrational parts. The subrational consists in vegetative (nutrition and growth) and the contra-rational, the part of soul that sometimes opposes reasonable action (appetite and desire).

BOOK II. *Chapter 1.* Virtue pertains to the intellect or the character. The former derives from being taught; the latter from habituation to desirable action. Virtues of character are learned, not inborn. One cannot change what is natural by force of habit. One becomes good by behaving well, and bad by misbehaving. So, the tenor of action generates character, for good or ill. We must behave well, and start early in life. *Chapter 2.* One studies virtue to become a good person

(1103b). Virtues and vices lie on a spectrum of behavior. Virtues and vices affect us by becoming habits toward good or bad acts. *Chapter 3*. Starting as children, all need to learn to savor certain kinds of pain, and avoid some pleasures. Political science engenders a certain attitude toward pleasures and pains. *Chapter 4*. One becomes virtuous by acting well with knowledge, from rational choice of the action for its own sake, and from a stable character. Most people do not behave in this way, and so lack virtue. *Chapter 5*. The soul has feelings, capacities, and states. In which lies virtue? Things go well for a man when he feels moderate anger, neither too much nor too little. So too other virtues. Virtue is a state. *Chapter 6*. A virtue causes a man to be in a good state with respect to its subject. Eyes are virtuous when they see well. Horses are virtuous when they run well. The mean lies equidistant between its extremes. Virtue of character lies at the mean of possible actions, not in their extreme or deficiency. Character goes wrong in a multitude of ways, but right only in one way. Virtue rationally chooses the mean (1107a). Words that identify wrong action have no mean; they are just wrong. *Chapter 7*. To be explicit, concerning fear, courage is the mean, cowering and rashness are the extremes. Concerning pain, the mean is temperance, the excesses insensibility and intemperance. Regarding small sums of money, the mean is generosity, the extremes are stinginess and wastefulness. Regarding large sums of money, the mean is magnificence, and the extremes are vulgarity and niggardliness. Concerning honor, the mean is greatness of soul, the excesses vanity and poverty of spirit. Regarding anger, one well disposed is even-tempered, the extremes are quick-tempered or slow-tempered. Regarding truth, one is truthful, the extremes being pretence and self-depreciation. Virtue lies between its extremes (1108a). Regarding laughing, the mean is witty, but excessive persons are clowns or boors. Concerning human relations, the virtue is friendliness, the extremes are flattery and peevishness. We also distinguish a spectrum regarding shame and indignation. *Chapter 8*. In virtues, each position (two extremes and the median virtue) oppose one another, with the extremes opposing each other most strongly. *Chapter 9*. Virtue, then, is the mean. Virtue proves difficult, because finding the mean proves slippery. As individuals, we have predispositions toward character traits. We recognize them by our attitudes toward pain or pleasure with respect to each thing. One should resist one's inclinations. Be especially wary of pleasure; none judges pleasure impartially. We sometimes reach the mean by over-correcting a bit for our predispositions.

BOOK III. *Chapter 1*. Since we praise only voluntary action, we must determine what is involuntary. Involuntary actions occur when one is forced or ignorant. Some apparently voluntary actions, however, appear compelled, as when one jettisons cargo in a storm or coerces by threats. They are both voluntary and involuntary, as mixed states. Coercion exists only where the external force is all and the person forced contributes nothing (1110b). When one acts from ignorance, that act is involuntary, and one regrets the ill outcomes. When one is ignorant by choice or through bad behaviors, then one is wicked in his ignorance and shows no regret. Aristotle discusses various forms of ignorance. Actions that emerge from our appetites or spirit are voluntary, though there are some contrary considerations. *Chapter 2*. Rational choice is voluntary, but an adult form of choice. Rationality elects means to ends that lie within one's own power. Rationality is neither wishing nor believing. The rational man chooses what he knows to be good. *Chapter 3*. What can be deliberated rationally? A man or group deliberates only what is possible for him or them to do. One deliberates about means, uncertainties, and ambiguities. Where puzzled, one deliberates with others. One does not deliberate ends (cure the patient), but means (what medicines or treatments might cure this patient?). What is possible is what one can accomplish or what one with his friends' help might accomplish. Rational choice brings to pass a deliberated desire for something within our powers. *Chapter 4*. People differ in what they wish for, though all think they wish for something good. The good person sees aright, choosing the good. The masses are deceived by pleasure and pain, often choosing the bad. *Chapter 5*. What can be chosen can also not be chosen, so we choose to be good or bad. Legislators punish ill behavior, but they also punish ignorance where avoidable. One's activities create one's character (1114a). Habit takes over, and it is no easy task for the bad man to become good, or vice versa. Some argue that none has control over their perceptions of good action, and so only those who are accidentally good choose well. None can blame wrong-doers. Aristotle answers that such thinking leaves virtue and vice pointless. All are involuntary, and so then without moral content. This cannot be right. *Chapter 6*. Courage concerns fear, which expects bad outcomes. Courage

addresses death in battle. No other particular fears, though grave, require courage. The word “courage” is used derivatively in a multitude of circumstances. *Chapter 7.* A courageous person fears only what is right to fear in the right circumstances, according to reasonable assessment of the current situation. Greater confidence than this is rashness. Dearth of confidence is cowardice. Suicide is cowardice. Aristotle explores similitudes of courage: citizen courage, courage under compulsion, spirited people as distinguished from the courageous, fighting in anger versus courage, and hopeful or ignorant confidence versus courage. *Chapter 9.* The courageous endure pain for a greater good often hidden. For the good man, courage faces greater dangers, for losing a good life exceeds losing a bad one. *Chapter 10.* Temperance concerns the right relationship to bodily pleasures such as the animals enjoy: food, drink, and sex. *Chapter 11.* The intemperate person excessively enjoys detestable things or enjoys right things more than one should, or excessively avoids these pleasures, even those that are right and good. *Chapter 12.* Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, and so more reprehensible. Children’s misbehaviors are sometimes called intemperance, since children pursue pleasure indiscriminately. Children must be taught discretion by their tutors.

BOOK IV. *Chapter 1.* The generous person excels in taking and giving wealth (things with monetized value), doing each appropriately. Stingy people take wealth too seriously. Wasteful people waste property, often on fruitless pursuits. Wealth is a tool well-used by generous people to give to those with need. A generous person often gives too much and looks too seldom to his own interests. One measures generosity by the proportion of a person’s property given; the poor may be generous. The stingy person benefits none, for he gives nothing. The wasteful person gives, but in the wrong ways. Most people suffer stinginess. *Chapter 2.* The magnificent person spends large amounts in good taste. The niggardly works on the cheap, while the vulgar spends ostentatiously for spurious ends. Magnificence creates good results on a grand scale, and inclines a person to spend on his or her community (1123a). *Chapter 3.* The great-souled person is, and believes he is, worthy of great things. He concerns himself rightly with honors. The extremes of vice are vanity and being small-souled. The magnificent person may think himself better than others, and it may be so. *Chapter 4.* It is a virtue to seek honor, even when such honors are not great (as in magnificence). One may seek too much or too little of such diminutive honor. This mean lacks a name. *Chapter 5.* To be even-tempered is not to be irascible or unmoved. One gets angry appropriately, neither too often nor too seldom. One is irascible in different modes: quick-tempered, irritable, cross, sulky. Sulky people are trouble to themselves and their friends (1126a). *Chapter 6.* Having balanced personal relationships is also a virtue. One neither rubberstamps the actions of others or opposes them wholesale. Rather, he lets the nobility of action guide. He is amicable with all, even though he may not know affection for those with whom he is involved. Such a person pleases others when that is appropriate, and causes no senseless pain, but will oppose others for cause. He also has an ascetic strain, accepting some pains for future pleasures. The extremes are flattery and belligerence. *Chapter 7.* Concerning truth, the extremes are boastfulness (claiming more for oneself or one’s view than is warranted), and self-deprecation (claiming less than warranted). The virtue between is truthfulness, in which a person claims only what is accurate. The truthful person tends toward understatement. *Chapter 8.* Quick wit is a virtue median to buffoonery and boorishness. One finds a right relation to amusement. *Chapter 9.* Shame is not a virtue, except in the young, who due to their many errors and acting from their feelings, are restrained rightly by shame. Older persons should do nothing that produces shame, being self-possessed.

BOOK V. *Chapter 1.* We must determine what justice is and what its extremes may be. Justice is lawful, fair action. Laws aim to produce happiness for a community. Justice combines all virtues; it seeks the weal of others, which is difficult. *Chapter 2.* When one gains at the expense of others, that greed is unjust. Justice is not only a whole, but also has just parts. So too wickedness. Laws tend to reinforce good citizenship, though that may differ somewhat from being a good person. *Chapter 3.* Justice entails equity. Equity is a term of proportion, and so has a middle term (a mean) in its formulation. Equity distributes equally when it is concerned with matters that pertain to all. *Chapter 4.* Injustice in this sense violates the proportion. In transactions, injustice creates unbalanced gains and losses. Judges intervene to rectify those imbalances. *Chapter 5.*

The Pythagoreans defined justice as reciprocity between parties. An economy is people associating for the purpose of proportional reciprocation. All exchanges must be proportional, but not necessarily equal. Money makes exchange possible by creating a unit by which the value of things may be proportioned to one another. Justice is not a mean like the other virtues. Injustice concerns extremes. *Chapter 6.* Political justice may exist only among people who work together for common good, who are free and generally equal. These must distinguish between justice and injustice in their actions. People who rule become tyrants because they act selfishly, unless constrained by law. Justice does not apply in households, with wives, slaves, and children. They are part of oneself, and one cannot be “just” with respect to oneself, since it is a relational term. *Chapter 7.* Political justice has natural and legal components. The natural components are universal; the legal parts are conventional, and so differ from place to place. *Chapter 8.* Just acts are voluntary, that is, not done in ignorance, under compulsion, or without the agent’s control. One may commit unjust acts without oneself being unjust. These are errors or misadventures. One acts unjustly only where one deliberates and chooses harm. *Chapter 9.* Justice and injustice are always voluntary acts. Every man acts for what he deems good, though he is not always correct. No man suffers injustices voluntarily. Can one act unjustly toward himself, say, in giving more than he ought to another? It may be so. Injustice comes easily; justice proves much more difficult, being a matter that emerges from a just character. Justice lives where people have good things but not to excess. For some, no quantum is sufficient; these are vicious people. *Chapter 10.* People speak in various ways about equity. Justice and equity are related. Equity corrects justice’s harshnesses. The equitable person declines to stand on his rights, even when warranted, and takes less than his share in matters. *Chapter 11.* Can a person act unjustly toward himself? This seems unlikely because justice exists only between people. One can permit injustices upon himself, as a form of self-control. And one may have some form of justice existing between parts of himself.

BOOK VI. *Chapter 1.* Aristotle analyzes the moral mean. All persons have a purpose in mind by which they govern actions. They aim at neither too little nor too much. In man, there is a reasoning part and an unreasoning part. Within reason, reason contemplates what cannot change (the deliberative) as well as what is changeable (the calculative). *Chapter 2.* Rationality is deliberated desire. To be good, these must have good ends. No moral thoughts live alone, apart from practical goals. Thinking is instrumental. We deliberate possible futures. Truth is that at which thinking aims. *Chapter 3.* Scientific knowledge concerns eternal things, things that cannot be otherwise. Some scientific knowledge is inductive, some deductive. Universal principles are known by induction. *Chapter 4.* One may produce (as demonstrating skill in building) or act (as in choosing) reasonably. *Chapter 5.* A man of practical wisdom recognizes the good and the bad for human beings, and acts on what makes life as a whole good (1140a). *Chapter 6.* Scientific knowledge cannot reach first principles because these are indemonstrable. Only the intellect addresses first principles. *Chapter 7.* Wisdom combines technical knowledge of what is honorable with rational intellect. Practical wisdom deliberates human affairs. *Chapter 8.* Political science has both a practical and a pure intellectual component. A person who is practically wise knows his own good and seeks it. But he does so in a context of his household and within a particular city. Practical wisdom grows from experience. *Chapter 9.* Good deliberation is not scientific knowledge, guesswork, readiness, or belief. Good deliberation calculates and inquires, leading to correctness of thought. *Chapter 10.* One with good judgment exercises practical wisdom. Judgment judges the matters that practical wisdom deliberates. *Chapter 11.* Discernment rightly judges matters of equity. The intellect, when judging first terms, seeks scientific demonstration; when judging practical matters, intellect seeks the right decision. More experienced persons see better, because they are practically wise. One should heed them. *Chapter 12.* Wisdom concerns first principles. Practical wisdom applies first principles to human life. Wickedness misleads us about first principles. Only the good are wise. *Chapter 13.* People are born with natural virtue, a penchant toward self-control, courage, and so forth. Real virtue supersedes natural virtue, as practical wisdom grows from right reason and creates real virtue of character.

BOOK VII. *Chapter 1.* One should avoid vice, incontinence, and brutishness, by seeking to be virtuous, self-controlled, and godlike. Procedurally, Aristotle prefers to discuss how people conceive a thing, then point out the puzzles that emerge, then consider enlightened opinions on the matter and choose that view that accords with enlightened opinion, or at least the most authoritative among those enlightened opinions (1145b). People say many different things about incontinence. *Chapter 2.* Socrates believed that all ill-action derives from ignorance. None chooses the bad knowingly. Others disagree, noting that people do ill knowing its dangers. The sophists create self-contradictions in people's views, thinking themselves clever. These are puzzles. *Chapter 3.* An incontinent person pursues evil by erroneous conviction. The intemperate person pursues evil, but knows it wrong. One may have his knowledge rendered ineffective by madness or strong passions. Such is the incontinent person; knowing, he still fails to know. *Chapter 4.* An incontinent person indulges his physical needs and avoids pains generally, contrary to his best opinions; he is incontinent without qualification. Others may overindulge in things otherwise good; these are incontinent with qualification. An incontinent person acts impulsively; the intemperate person acts from flawed judgment. *Chapter 5.* Brutish states (infanticide, cannibalism) develop by disability, wicked nature, disease, madness, or perverse habits. These are not incontinence. All excess is either brutish or diseased. *Chapter 6.* Incontinence of spirit carries less shame than incontinence in appetites. The former hears reason, but distorts it. Brutishness is not so bad as vice, but more to be feared. The brute lacks reason. But a bad, but rational, human can wreak all manner of havoc. *Chapter 7.* Most people incline toward intemperance. An intemperate person who lacks regret is incurable. Some cannot resist what others resist easily, even when their softness is not due to disease or being female. Impetuous people are also incontinent; they cannot wait for reason. *Chapter 8.* Incontinence is not vice, because it acts against reason, while vice acts with its own rational justification. The incontinent is not stupid, but does what stupid people do. *Chapter 9.* Must a person, to be temperate, pursue any reason, or only the best reason? Some are obstinate, resisting contrary reasons, due to affection for one's own opinion, ignorance, or boorishness. A few people are intemperate due to failure to enjoy pleasure. *Chapter 10.* The practically wise person knows and is ready to act. An incontinent person knows what is best, but fails to do it. *Chapter 11.* Political philosophers choose ends for action, and so consider pleasure and pain. Concerning pleasures, some view them as goods, others evils, yet others mixed. *Chapter 12.* As to pleasures, people differ. Something bad for one may prove good for another. Pleasures are ends in themselves, not pathways to something greater. Men exercise their capacities and are pleased. Practical wisdom seeks more to avoid pains than to experience pleasures. *Chapter 13.* The happy life weaves together pleasure with some material possessions and luck. No tortured person can be happy, no matter what he knows. Those who say otherwise talk nonsense. Pleasure may be the chief good; all animals and men seek it. *Chapter 14.* There are not good and bad pleasures, but only pleasures overindulged. One explains the falseness of false views to make true views more compelling. Some falsely rank bodily pleasures above all others. They do so because pleasures may reduce pain, or because they can experience nothing more subtle as pleasurable, or because they are young. Pleasures are not consistent because men are complex. Only gods experience unrelieved pleasure.

BOOK VIII. *Chapter 1.* Friendship relates to virtue and is an absolute necessity for men. Of all treasures, men value friendship most. Friendship benefits all. The young avoid mistakes when counseled. The aged receive needed help. Those in between think and act better because of friends. People are generally amicable, and inclined to build friendship with strangers. Friendship glues cities together. Every city treats civil conflict as an evil. Friends need no justice, and the highest justice exists when friends care for one another. People disagree much about the origin of friendship. Some argue likes tend to bind in friendship; others think opposites cling to one another. *Chapter 2.* Good, useful, or pleasant things are loved. In the end, people love what is good for them, or seems so. Friendship entails reciprocity. One wishes a friend good; a friend wishes one's good. Good will is a friendly attitude without knowledge of reciprocation from others. *Chapter 3.* Friendships are of three sorts: utilitarian, pleasant, or good. Friends for utility use one another for benefits. Friends for pleasure use one another to create pleasant lives. Such friendships dissolve easily, since they are based in something other than the friend's character.

Such friends may spend little time together. They share only as much time as renders benefit or pleasure. Youths become friends to share pleasure or sex. Complete friendship values the friend because he is good. Since based in virtue, the friends do well to one another and endure, as does virtue. They tend to make similar choices, both being good people. Such friendships also bring pleasure and utility, but exceed these. Friendship of this sort are rare because virtuous people are few. One also requires time and opportunity to build such friendships. It takes time to build mutual confidence and prove worthiness. Friends for utility or pleasure can be bad people; a good person can befriend a bad one. Friends tend not to believe slanders of their friend. Friends have tested friends and trust one another. Friendship other than that between good people is friendship only in some analogical sense. *Chapter 5.* Distance tends to dissolve friendships, even where good will perseveres between people. Friends tend to spend time together doing things both find pleasant. They live in one another's company. Friendship is a state of being accompanied by a feeling of affection. To love a friend is to love oneself. To be a friend is to become a good for another. *Chapter 6.* Sour and elderly people tend to enjoy others less, and so become friends less frequently. No one can have many complete friendships. These require much time and mutual knowledge. Seeking the same things from one another, friends become equals. Lesser friendship can abound. Politicians tend to have lesser friendships or none at all, because they require superior virtue to reach beneath themselves to elevate a complete friend. Friendships based on utility or pleasure are really only apparent friendships. *Chapter 7.* Friendships between parents and children, or elder and younger, or man and woman, or ruler and ruled, are of another type. What such friends give to one another is proportional and appropriate to each partner. If circumstances change so dramatically that friends are no longer equals, friendship may prove impossible. Equality matters in friendship. *Chapter 8.* Most people prefer flattery to friendship. Friends are willing to love more than be loved. Among friends, love is the core virtue. Wicked people tend to form utilitarian relationships. *Chapter 9.* Community and friendship are coextensive. One becomes friends with those in his community, and to the degree one's community requires (1159b). Being a good friend is what it means to be just. Communities exist to do something useful together in fashioning a life. *Chapter 10.* There exist three forms of social organization: kingdoms, aristocracies, and timocracies (based on property ownership). Having a king is best. Distributing rule to all property owners is worst. Tyranny perverts kingdoms; the ruler seeks his own, not his subjects', well-being. Oligarchy perverts aristocracy; the oligarchs hoard wealth and rule for themselves. Timocracy is perverted by democracy; democracy perverts its parent least. Household administration has similar structures and perversions. *Chapter 11.* Friendships among people (father and son, man and woman, brothers) depend upon justice in giving and taking according to role. In perversions, little of friendship remains. One cannot be friends with tools, neither with oxen nor hammers. A slave is a tool with a soul; friendship is not possible, except to the extent he is not considered a slave but a human being. *Chapter 12.* Friendship emerges within community (1161b). One might consider parent-child relations as a separate category. Generally, friendship deepens as common life expands and similarities grow numerous. Friendship of man and woman may include sex. Regardless, being different, each contributes what they are to the common purpose. When people hold people or values in common, those things bind them. *Chapter 13.* There exist three sorts of friendship: that between equals, that between superior and inferior, and that based on use or pleasure. Friendships of utility give rise to complaints, for mutual use cannot always be equal. Such friends should return at least as much as they were given. *Chapter 14.* Superior-inferior friendships can also lead to disputes. One thinks he gave too much; the other that he received too little, and so friendship ends. One preserves friendship by allocating benefits with relative equality. Friendship seeks to do for the other what can be done. The masses seek to avoid doing their part, fearing they will give without recompense.

BOOK IX. *Chapter 1.* Aristotle considers puzzles in the nature of friendship. When people are dissimilar, friendships of pleasure or utility find troubles. It proves difficult to give adequately to the other, since one's abilities change over time. Only friendships of character, which value the other for his inner essence, persevere. One finds complaints when he promises much but delivers little, as do the sophists. In learning philosophy, no financial return is possible, since the gift is so great. In such cases, one gives in return what seems fair enough to both parties. *Chapter 2.*

Giving to friends and receiving from them admits of no precise rules. Many factors must be considered, and the subject matter does not admit stringent analysis. One decides as best one can. *Chapter 3.* Should friendship end where one friend changes? Most friendships end when one friend recognizes that the friendship has a basis different from what he presumed. If a friend turns out to be wicked and cannot be redeemed, one may break off friendship. If a person becomes very much better over time, friendship may falter. These have so little in common. Even after friendship, one should continue to hold a special place for the former friends. *Chapter 4.* Friends are another self (1166a). The good person is centered, seeks and does good, is thoughtful in his actions, loves life, relishes his past acts, and lacks regret. As he is to himself, so he is to a friend. Intimate friends have a relation to their friend like that their friend has with himself. One can consider them a plural entity. The wicked lack friendship, even with themselves. Wicked people shrink from what they deem good. They avoid contact with themselves and hide in their relationships with others, who become pallid friends. The wicked soul fights itself, wants this, then that, pulling itself to pieces. The wicked dwell in regret. Avoid wickedness. *Chapter 5.* Good will (*eunoia*) is friendly sentiment toward others, a precursor of friendship. Good will combined with cooperative action generates friendship. Good will is latent friendship. Good will becomes friendship as intimacy grows. *Chapter 6.* Friends have concord (*homonoiia*). This is not agreement, but rather acting together in acts jointly deemed good. So concord is social harmony, seeking what is best for one's community. Discord arises when people want others to do the good, but decline to do it themselves. *Chapter 7.* Benefactors love beneficiaries more than beneficiaries love benefactors. This is how the masses act, liking benefit more than benefiting others. Producers like their products excessively. Where one contributes labor, one grows invested emotionally. Treating others well is hard work. *Chapter 8.* Some say self-love is wrong. Others think it critically important. Those who disapprove self-love have in mind people who take for themselves more than their share. Those who praise self-love think of such a person as choosing noble acts, doing self-sacrifice for the common good. The good man loves himself intensely (1169b). *Chapter 9.* Happy people have friends; friends are one of life's great treasures, which make a man happy. A friend gives a good man a place to practice his goodness. Humans are social; we live together. None is happy alone (1169b). Friends help one do good acts continuously. One loves oneself; so too friends, since they are extensions of self. The core of living together is exchanging words and thoughts. Having virtuous friends is one component of happiness. *Chapter 10.* How many friends should a man seek? Of friendships of pleasure and utility, a few suffice. But concerning intimate friends, one should have as many as one can live with and share comfortably. These should be friends with one another as well, since they are going to spend a great deal of time together. So the number cannot be too great. One cannot share oneself with large numbers of people; they overwhelm. So, be satisfied with a few intimate friends (1171a). *Chapter 11.* Intimate friendship is inherently pleasurable. One needs intimates more when bad things happen, for friends lighten one's load. Strong people keep their pain from friends, in order not to distress them. They call on friends when they derive great benefit from little trouble to friends. This happens often when good fortune strikes. When friends help one, receive gratefully, but try not to burden them. *Chapter 12.* Friendship is community. People live together, doing what they value most, as friends. Friends become like one another. So seek good people as friends. Evil people also have a sort of friendship; they make one another worse every day. Avoid them. Friendship with good people makes one a better person (1172a).

BOOK X. *Chapter 1.* One learns virtue by learning the right attitudes toward pain and pleasure. Some say pleasure is good; others hate pleasure. Some discredit pleasure without conviction, since they believe it is better to delude the masses as to the worth of pleasure, seeking for them a mean (of sorts). *Chapter 2.* Eudoxus argues that pleasure is the good because people aim at it; in the same manner, all avoid pain. Plato disagreed because nothing can be added to the good to make it better, but pleasure with intelligence exceeds pleasure alone. *Chapter 3.* Pleasure has degrees, and yet is not indeterminate. Some argue that pleasure comes to be; Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a process. Others argue that pain depletes and pleasure replenishes us. But not all pains and pleasures follow this depletion-replenishment scheme; consider learning, perception, smell, memory. Pleasures come in types; some are disgraceful. The pleasure afforded by a friend differs from that offered by a flatterer. These considerations make it clear that pleasure is not the

good. *Chapter 4.* What is pleasure? Pleasure is whole when experienced, as is vision. So, pleasure is not a process, which takes time. Pleasures correspond to each sense ability in humans, including thought and reflection. Pleasure in an experience arises when both subject and object are at their best. Pleasure fades as one's energy and attention flag. Pleasure attends living. Every person chooses pleasures he prefers by undertaking activities that lead to those pleasures. *Chapter 5.* Pleasures differ from one another, each completing different human capacities. Doing an activity with pleasure makes one better at the task. That which gives a person pleasure distracts him from other sorts of pleasures because pleasures compete. Pleasure in bad acts is an evil. Humans differ greatly in what brings one pleasure or pain. In this welter, the perceptions of the good person are to be trusted. *Chapter 6.* What remains to discuss is happiness (*eudaemonia*). To sum what has come before, happiness is not a state, but rather an activity. Happiness is an end in itself, and needs nothing to complete it. Being a good man has nothing to do with political power. The good man is the measure of all things pertaining to happiness. One behaves foolishly when he pursues amusements. Amusements serve only to relax one in preparation for serious work. Happiness is activity that accords with virtue. *Chapter 7.* The highest activity is contemplation. Contemplation is most likely to lead to happiness. Wisdom is contemplation enacted. One who contemplates needs others least, since he can contemplate alone. War and politics have virtues, but are laborious. Contemplation comes with ease and is superior in every way. The intellect is in some way supra-human, semi-divine. We should seek such heights as often as possible. A life of intellect is the happiest, most human life. *Chapter 8.* But virtues of lesser sorts also bring happy life, insofar as they are human. Virtue of character is deeply bound to feelings, some of which come from the body. Character virtues combine intellectual and bodily feelings into a human life of practical wisdom. Still, the intellectual virtues stand apart categorically. Any virtuous character requires at least some financial means, for one must eat. The virtues lower than those of the intellect also require sums of money to do justice, wield power, and so forth. Virtuous action presupposes people with whom the actor lives and acts, and their life together. Gods live in contemplation. No animal can be happy because none contemplate. One needs some material prosperity to be happy, but not much. Rulers and the rich show less virtue than those of modest means. Some think that a happy person would seem absurd to the masses, since they judge by externals. What matters is the facts of our life. Our theories matter little if they do not improve our facts. *Chapter 9.* Knowing of virtue matters nothing if one does not seek to attain it for oneself. This sort of reasoning never influences the masses, who live by their feelings and know no shame. The masses cannot be changed by argument, since their vices are long entrenched in habit. To change those who act under the control of their feelings, only force suffices. Instead, communities should aim to bring up children in a manner that makes them ready to become temperate, persevering adults. Even with such upbringing, the masses will still need laws to guide them in every aspect of life. For they heed punishment, not argument. Communities should say what is reasonable, make it into law for those who need punishments, and banish those who nevertheless cannot behave themselves. The good person is raised for virtue, makes virtue his habit, then lives doing well by others and does nothing corrupt. He does so because his intellect controls him, and he lives in a good system with power over him. Laws prescribe what is intellectually and practically good. Only Sparta shows concern for the upbringing of children; all others neglect this, and leave it to personal whim. It is best to have public concern for the upbringing of children, and to reflect the appropriate values in laws. If one wishes to improve others, let him develop those skills just as does a doctor or other scientist. The political lawmaker needs experience, not just ideas. To gain that experience, one examines the political institutions of the various cities to see what aspects of them cause them to perform well or badly. One may be able to determine what political system is, among these exemplars, best, and thereby glean what structures, laws, and habits should be inculcated. To that task, Aristotle turns in his sequel to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Politics*.